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Note 
Proportional Union or Paper Confederacy? 
JENNIFER KARR 
American Founders worked tirelessly to end the lack of representation 
colonists had faced under British rule. The Constitution requires that each 
state be apportioned a proportional number of representatives in the 
House of Representatives. Throughout the first 120 years of the nation’s 
history, the size of the House increased in proportion to population. 
Though population continued to grow exponentially, the Apportionment 
Act of 1911 limited the House to 435 representatives. One hundred years 
later, the population has increased by nearly 220 million, but the number 
of representatives in the House remains stunted at 435. This mismatched 
growth and stiltedness results in greatly disparate representation in the 
federal government between residents of neighboring states, as well as 
inaccurate outcomes in federal elections.   
This Note argues that the Founders’ goal of proportionality in 
representation should be striven for in four ways. First, repealing the limit 
on representatives in the Apportionment Act of 1911 should be 
accompanied by a new formula for determining the number of 
representatives apportioned to each state that resembles the formula used 
in other western countries. Second, we should change the formula for 
determining how many representatives each state will receive to a method 
previously used, which lacks all bias. The second two changes I propose 
are geared towards fairer presidential elections. First, each state should 
elect to split Electoral College votes in order to better represent the 
choices of the electorate. Second, the Twelfth Amendment requirement that 
in the event of no Electoral College winner the vote must go to the House 
should be repealed. Enacting these changes will result in a better 
represented electorate, which will more closely resemble the Founders’ 
vision. 
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Proportional Union or Paper Confederacy?1 
JENNIFER KARR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The current method of representative apportionment in the United 
States results in wide chasms between average district sizes in each state. 
For example, Montana has only one district, consisting of its entire 
population of 994,416.2 Conversely, Rhode Island’s two districts contain 
527,624 people each.3 That means that a voter in Rhode Island is worth 
1.88 times that of a voter in Montana. When Montana challenged this 
apportionment in 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the state, 
finding that granting Montana a second representative (by taking away a 
representative from Washington) would actually increase the relative 
deviation from ideal district size in both states.4 With a statutory cap at 435 
representatives in the House of Representatives, such disparities are 
unavoidable. 
Not only does this statutory cap result in voters in some states counting 
as more than voters in other states, but it skews the results of presidential 
elections. Many more people cast votes for president than any other type of 
representative.5Apportionment affects the amount of representation each 
state has in Congress, and it controls how many Electoral College votes 
each state receives.6 Rhode Island, a state with 1,052,567 residents, 
                                                                                                                          
1 During the Constitutional Convention Debates, James Madison warned that lack of proportional 
representation would result in a “paper confederacy.” Rule of Representation in the First Branch of the 
Legislature [29 June] 1787, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-
10-02-0049 [http://perma.cc/K9Y7-KH2B] (last visited May 2, 2015). 
* University of Connecticut School off Law, J.D. Candidate 2016; University of Central Florida, 
M.F.A. Creative Writing, 2013. First, I would like to thank my family for their love and support. I 
would especially like to thank Professor Douglas Spencer, for his thorough and insightful comments 
and suggestions, as well as his support, in writing this Note. Finally, I would like to thank my 
colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful feedback and editing. 
2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT: 2010 
CENSUS BRIEFS 2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
FJ6R-N5QQ]. 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 462 (1992). 
5 See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Voter Turnout Always Drops Off for Midterm Elections, but Why?, 
PEW RES. CTR. (July 24, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/24/voter-turnout-
always-drops-off-for-midterm-elections-but-why/ [http://perma.cc/X537-HWB2] (noting that fewer 
votes have been cast in midterm elections since 1840). 
6 What Is the Electoral College?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/about.html [http://perma.cc/DB5P-ZHZQ] (last visited May 13, 2015). 
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received a total of four Electoral College votes in 2010.7 Montana, on the 
other hand, with a resident population of 989,415, only 63,152 less than 
Rhode Island, received three Electoral College votes.8  
Among the reasons this apportionment is problematic is that, while the 
Senate was created as part of The Great Compromise to give small states 
equal representation in Congress, the House of Representatives was formed 
to give states proportional representation.9 The proportionality of House 
representation must be questioned when a vote in Rhode Island is worth 
1.88 times that of a vote in Montana. The single House representative in 
Montana is expected to know, understand, and act on the needs of nearly 
one million people, whereas each representative from Rhode Island need 
only advocate for a little over 525,000 people. Further, Montana and 
Rhode Island are vastly different in size and population density. Montana 
is 145,545.8 square miles, with only 6.8 people per square mile.10 Rhode 
Island, on the other hand, is 1,033.81 square miles with 1,018.1 people per 
square mile.11A Rhode Island representative has to account for only 
525,000 people who live within close proximity to one another, whereas a 
Montana representative must serve almost twice as many people in a state 
that is nearly 141 times the size of Rhode Island. Montana’s population is 
94% that of Rhode Island, yet it receives only 75% of the voting power of 
Rhode Island in presidential elections. 
The problem does not end there. Not only must Congress fix interstate 
apportionment, but the states must each change how their electors vote in 
the Electoral College to better reflect the preferences of all voters.  
This Note explores the history of apportionment in the United States 
and argues that an increase in Representatives in the House is necessary in 
order to preserve proportional representation. Further, this Note suggests 
splitting Electoral College votes to give each state a greater chance of 
being adequately represented and the U.S. electorate an increased 
likelihood of electing the presidential candidate of its choice. 
Part II discusses the history and current state of U.S. interstate 
apportionment. Part III delves into the problems with the current system,  
and Part IV offers a solution to these problems. Part V discusses 
improvements that should be made to the Electoral College and Twelfth 
Amendment, and Part VI applies a solution to the 2000 presidential 
election in order to show how the result could have been different. Finally, 
                                                                                                                          
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 2. 
8 Id. 
9 See infra note 22. For context, note that the Senate deviation, as of 2010, was 66.1. 
10 State and County QuickFacts: Montana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/30000.html [http://perma.cc/Z4CP-S4GQ] (last visited May 11, 2015). 
11 State and County QuickFacts: Rhode Island, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.cen 
sus.gov/qfd/states/44000.html [http://perma.cc/FH2X-CBG5] (last visited May 11, 2015). 
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Part VII concludes by reiterating the importance of proportionality and 
accuracy in apportionment.  
II.  HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF APPORTIONMENT 
Since the founding of the United States, disagreement over how to 
conduct the apportionment process has led to somewhat varied, and 
arguably arbitrary, outcomes. The Constitution provides only four 
requirements: (1) there cannot be more than one representative for every 
thirty thousand individuals;12 (2) each state must be given at least one 
representative;13 (3) House districts may not cross state lines;14 and (4) 
“[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according 
to their respective numbers.”15 These requirements are at best a rough 
guide, but we can look to history for their source and purpose. 
A.  The Great Compromise 
The Continental Convention’s apportionment discussions leading up to 
The Great Compromise16 have been described as “intense debates”17 and as 
being marked by “nearly paralyzing bitterness.”18 Tension existed between 
the more populated and less populated states, which were loath to 
relinquish any power they might glean for themselves.19 For instance, 
while James Madison, who hailed from the large state of Virginia, argued 
for proportional representation,20 delegates from small states argued for 
“equality of voices,” security for the small states, and “equivalent state 
sovereignty.”21 On July 16, 1787 the Convention approved the 
Compromise by a margin of only one vote, giving small states equal 
representation in the Senate and large states proportional representation in 
the House.22  
                                                                                                                          
12 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
16 The Great Compromise was a decision voted on by the Founders that provided for the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. A Great Compromise, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artand 
history/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm [http://perma.cc/7UUL-UJG5]. 
17 MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE IDEAL OF 
ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 1–2 (1982). 
18 Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1145 (2012). 
19 See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 9 (discussing the small states’ fear of, and the large 
states’ preference for, proportional representation). 
20 See Coenen, supra note 18, at 1146 (noting Madison’s adamancy towards proportional 
representation). 
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22 A Great Compromise, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/ 
A_Great_Compromise.htm [http://perma.cc/Z9MM-FFQ3]. 
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While the Great Compromise provided for proportional representation 
in the House of Representatives, it did not explain precisely how to 
apportion seats. The only requirements were that congressional districts 
must consist of at least thirty thousand people, and that each state must 
have at least one representative.23 It was expected that “[t]he House of 
Representatives would indeed grow as the nation enlarged,”24 but what 
exactly that might entail as far as apportionment remained unclear at the 
time. 
While today the House is set at 435 seats, the Framers, rather, 
“approached the question . . . as a ratio of representation.”25 Thomas 
Jefferson worried that a House too small might risk “domination by special 
interests[,]” and critics noted that a small House “would result in 
Representatives lacking ‘a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of 
their large constituencies.’”26 James Madison, on the other hand, asserted 
that “the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to 
avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.”27 However, 
Madison also argued that since the passage of every ten years required a 
new census, the House would grow to four hundred members within fifty 
years, thereby rendering moot any concerns of a small House.28 However, 
he also spoke when there were only thirteen states and fewer than four 
million people.29 
B.  The Original First Amendment 
The first Congress met in 1789 to propose twelve amendments to the 
Constitution.30 Of these twelve, the third through the twelfth were ratified, 
but not the first or second.31The originally proposed first amendment 
remains the only one of the twelve to never have been ratified. It reads: 
After the first enumeration required by the first article of the 
Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every 
                                                                                                                          
23 See supra notes 12–15. 
24 1 FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 31, 38 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
25 Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the 
Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999, 1005 (2013). 
26 Id. at 1006. 
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison). 
28 Id. 
29 1790 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through 
_the_decades/fast_facts/1790_fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/M2DW-ZPNY] (last visited Sept. 28, 
2015). 
30 The Bill of Rights, CHARTERS OF FREEDOM, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of 
_rights_transcript.html [http://perma.cc/FUK4-L8Q4] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
31 Id. The original second amendment stated: “No law, varying the compensation for the services 
of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have 
intervened[]” and was ratified in 1992 as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Id. 
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thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one 
hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by 
Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred 
Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every 
forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives 
shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall 
be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than 
two hundred Representatives, nor more than one 
Representative for every fifty thousand persons.32 
Though never ratified, this original first amendment was defeated in 
1789 by merely one vote.33 While the amendment would not affect the size 
of the House today, this proposed amendment shows that the Framers were 
deeply concerned with creating a fair and accurate ratio of persons to 
representatives.  
C.  Ratios of Representation 
With the first inaugural census in 1790 came disagreements over what 
to do with fractions of seats.34  Should the math determine that a state 
receive six votes, apportioning six votes would be easy enough.  But how 
should numbers coming out to 5.25, 5.5, and 5.75, be evaluated? Should 
they be rounded up or down? Or should another method be adopted? 
Congress adopted Hamilton’s method,35 and subsequently other methods 
were used.36 
While the size of the House steadily grew from 1790 to 1910, the 
Apportionment Act of 1911 established a cap at 435 representatives.37 
Thus, the House grew over 120 years based on population, but in the last 
105 years, it has remained static. The 1790 census revealed a population of 
a little over 3.9 million.38 In 1910, the population had grown to just over 92 
million.39 By 2010, the population was over 308 million.40 Figure 1, below, 
                                                                                                                          
32 Id. 
33 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1138 (1991). 
34 See Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1007–08 (discussing disagreements over whether fractions of 
seats should be rounded up, rounded down, or treated otherwise). 
35 For a discussion of Hamilton’s method, see Methods of Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html [https: 
//perma.cc/QU4T-N5A9] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
36 For a discussion of all the methods the United States has used, see supra note 35. 
37 Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, § 1, 37 Stat 13, 13–14; see also Gaughan, supra note 25, at 
1010 (discussing the steady growth of the House of Representatives until the Apportionment Act of 
1911). 
38 1790 Fast Facts, supra note 29. 
39 1910 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the 
_decades/fast_facts/1910_fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/LMG3-LEA9] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
40 Resident Population Data, U.S. CENSUS 2010, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/ 
apportionment-pop-text.php [http://perma.cc/2RHS-TU9T] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
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compares U.S. population and House size since 1790.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
This figure illustrates that, in 1790, one member of the House 
represented roughly 60,000 people; in 1910, one member represented 
roughly 212,000; and in 2010, one member represented roughly 710,000 
people. In other words, a representative in 2010 was responsible for 
representing nearly twelve times more constituents than if he had been a 
representative in 1790. The U.S. Census Bureau projects a rise in 
population by 2020 to 341.4 million.41 If the House stays at 435 seats, that 
will leave one representative for about every 784,828 people, or thirteen 
times as many constituents per representative as in 1790. Recall that some 
critics, including Thomas Jefferson, believed the size of the House in 1790 
to be too small to adequately represent the People. Given that James 
Madison expected the House to consist of four hundred members by 1840, 
it is difficult to imagine that even he would have approved of our current 
ratio.  
A major catalyst for the American Revolution was the colonists’ lack 
of representation in British Parliament.42 American colonists were 
“virtually represented” in the House of Commons.43 Under this virtual 
                                                                                                                          
41 Mitra Toossi, Labor Force Projections to 2020: A More Slowly Growing Workforce, 135 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 43, 45 (2012). 
42 See American Revolution History, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/american-
revolution/american-revolution-history [http://perma.cc/MA6F-3YHM] (last visited May 13, 2015). 
43 Proportional Representation, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/ 
Institution/Origins-Development/Proportional-Representation/ [http://perma.cc/V3SS-Q6RU] (last 
visited May 13, 2015). 
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representation, members of Parliament were considered to represent 
everyone, even though there were no representatives in Parliament who 
were residents of the colonies.44 Another—albeit less catchy—way of 
putting the familiar cry of “No taxation without representation” is that it 
comes from the colonists’ frustration that the British Parliament kept 
raising taxes on them without apportioning the colonists any actual 
representation in Parliament.45 Thus, apportionment “was viewed as one of 
the most fundamental issues to be decided at the Convention.”46  
Other industrialized nations have addressed apportionment in various 
ways. Like the United States, Canada performs a decennial census 
followed by reapportionment in order to facilitate proportional 
representation.47 Since 1867, the number of representatives in the Canadian 
House of Commons has increased from 181 to 308.48 The United Kingdom 
is divided into 650 constituencies.49 Each constituency elects one 
representative to the House of Commons.50 The median constituency size 
across the United Kingdom varies from 56,800 in Wales to 72,400 in 
England.51 
Japan has enabled even more malapportionment than the United States. 
For example, in 2012, the ratio of disparity between the smallest and 
largest districts was 1:2.38.52 However, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled 
that a ratio of disparity of 1:2 or greater was unconstitutional.53 While 
Japan is known for its malapportionment, it differs from the United States 
in that Japanese malapportionment “does not significantly affect election 
outcomes.”54 And despite such disparity, Japan’s apportionment method 
                                                                                                                          
44 Id. 
45 American Revolution History, supra note 42 (discussing events leading up to the Revolutionary 
War). 
46 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 6. 
47 The House of Commons and Its Members, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
marleaumontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch04&Seq=2&Language=E [http://perma.cc/FDN2-
SHMF] (last visited May 13, 2015). 
48 HOUSE OF COMMONS PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE (Audrey O’Brien & Marc Bosc eds., 2d ed. 
2009), http://www.parl.gc.ca/procedure-book-livre/document.aspx?sbdid=2ae20cbe-e824-466b-b37c-
8941bbc99c37&sbpidx=2 [http://perma.cc/4P5R-7D6L]; House of Commons Seat Allocation by 
Province, ELECTIONS CANADA, http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=cir/red/allo& 
document=index&lang=e [http://perma.cc/72WM-ET7V] (last modified Mar. 23, 2012). 
49 How MPs Are Elected, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/ 
members/electing-mps/ [http://perma.cc/27B7-ZP9D] (last visited May 13, 2015). 
50 Id. 
51 Parliament Constituencies, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-
and-voting/constituencies/ [http://perma.cc/R6CW-QUS9] (last visited May 13, 2015). 
52 Ray Christensen, Malapportionment and the 2012 House of Representatives Election, in 
ROBERT PEKKANEN, STEVEN REED & ETHAN SCHEINER, JAPAN DECIDES 2012: THE JAPANESE 
GENERAL ELECTION 139 (2013). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 140. 
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avoids “contorted or gerrymandered election districts.”55 Japan, with a 
population of 127.9 million, has 475 representatives in its lower chamber 
(or one representative for every 269,263 people).56 
India attempts to maintain as close to an equal ratio of representation 
in its Lok Sabha (“House of the People”) between states as possible.57 Yet, 
with a population of 1,236,344,631 (about four times that of the United 
States), India has only 552 representatives in the Lok Sabha.58 Different 
from most Western countries, China has a unicameral Congress known as 
the National People’s Congress (NPC).59 According to the NPC, 
apportionment of delegates is based on “the proportion of the population” 
with a minimum of fifteen delegates to each province.60 “At the same time, 
the allocation should make sure that there is appropriate representation of 
all ethnic groups, people from all walks of life and all political parties 
within the NPC.”61 There are nearly 3,000 delegates to the NPC, but some 
commentators doubt whether the delegates really represent the people.62 
Each industrialized nation has addressed apportionment of 
representatives in its own way, having each faced challenges unique to 
their histories. Yet, as a matter of empirics, most lower house chambers in 
the world are about the size of the cube root of the population.63 This 
phenomenon is known as the Cube Root Law of National Assembly Size 
(“Cube Root Law”).64 See Figure 2 for an illustration of where other 
countries and the U.S. fall in relation to the cubed root of their populations.  
                                                                                                                          
55 Id.  
56 Countries of the World, WORLD ATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/cty 
popls.htm [http://perma.cc/F6TC-WL7N] (last modified Aug. 11, 2015); Strength of the In-House 
Groups in the House of Representatives, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/ 
internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/strength.htm [http://perma.cc/9KYT-WEVT] (last 
modified Aug. 20, 2015). 
57 LOK SABHA HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE, http://loksabha.nic.in/ [http://perma.cc/4BYV-R82S] (last 
visited May 12, 2015). 
58 Id.; Country Comparison: Population, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html [https://perma.cc/PGT2-7V9S] (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2015). 
59 National People’s Congress, NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm [http://perma.cc/WB66-DL4N] (last 
visited May 12, 2015). 
60 NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, http://www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/27743.htm [http://per 
ma.cc/M2NJ-4TVW] (last visited May 12, 2015). 
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., How China Is Ruled: National People’s Congress, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13908155 [http://perma.cc/9N3B-CRY7] (discussing the 
National People’s Congress’s lack of independence). 
63 Ryan Teague Beckwith, Is Congress Too Small? Some Think So, DENVER POST (Feb. 20, 2013, 
7:46 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/politics-national/2013/02/is-congress-too-small-some-think-so/ 
[http://perma.cc/K4JL-VMB7]. 
64 Id. 
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Figure 265 
 
In Figure 2, the x-axis represents the country’s population and the y-
axis represents the size of the lower house chamber. Note that the dotted 
line represents the cube root of the population, and that most nations fall 
somewhere along or near that line. The U.S. is an outlier with a House size 
of only about sixty-five percent of its population’s cube root. The United 
Kingdom and Italy are also outliers; however, they each have much larger 
chambers for their population sizes, meaning there are more 
representatives per person in the United Kingdom and Italy than in most 
other nations. In other words, the people in these nations are more fully 
represented than Americans. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed that apportionment should be 
proportional.66 However, its navigation of intra- and interstate 
malapportionment has not been entirely consistent. 
                                                                                                                          
65 To see the size of each country’s population and lower chamber, see The World Factbook, 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ [http://per 
ma.cc/9P9U-CHXN] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
66 Wesberry v. Sanders, 36 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), discussed in greater detail infra. 
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D.  Supreme Court Rulings 
The Supreme Court has avoided officially ruling on the 
constitutionality of interstate malapportionment. However, it has ruled that 
intrastate malapportionment is unconstitutional.67 Let us first look at two 
cases in which the Court at least addressed interstate malapportionment. 
When Montana challenged apportionment based on a disparity 
between its own district size and those of Washington, the Court found 
that, in matters of interstate apportionment, Congress is entitled to 
expansive deference.68 The Court acknowledged that “common sense 
supports a test requiring a good-faith effort to achieve precise 
mathematical equality,”69 but found that “the constraints imposed by 
Article I, § 2, itself make that goal illusory for the Nation as a whole.”70 
Yet, in U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana, ruling in favor of 
Montana would have resulted in “increasing the variance in the relative 
difference between the ideal and the size of the districts in both Montana 
and Washington.”71 This, the Court found problematic. 
Four years later, the Court evaluated whether changes to the method of 
conducting the census might be required, and addressed the matter of 
interstate apportionment.72 Though the Court of Appeals applied the 
Wesberry v. Sanders standard of “one person-one vote,” the Supreme 
Court found that the appellate court “undervalued the significance of the 
fact that the Constitution makes it impossible to achieve population 
equality among interstate districts.”73 Though this may sound damning to 
proponents of interstate apportionment reform, the impossibility of 
achieving exact population equality should not be a deterrent to improving 
on our current system for two reasons: (1) Wesberry has set the stage for 
greater equality in interstate apportionment, and (2) the legislature could 
also make several changes to increase equality without amending the 
Constitution.  
Despite having given little direction for remedying interstate 
malapportionment, the Court has specifically addressed intrastate 
malapportionment. Writing for the majority in Wesberry, Justice Black 
stated: “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a 
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good 
                                                                                                                          
67 Id. 
68 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 464 (1992) (“[A]pportionment of 
Representatives among the several States ‘according to their respective Numbers’ commands far more 
deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid 
mathematical standard.”). 
69 Id. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 462. 
72 Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1996). 
73 Id. at 17. 
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citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the 
right to vote is undermined.”74 In Wesberry, citizens and qualified voters of 
one Georgia county challenged the apportionment among Georgia districts 
due to vast discrepancies in their populations.75 The Court held “that 
Representatives be chosen by the People of the several States means that as 
nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be 
worth as much as another’s.”76 
Justice Black went on to write: 
We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution 
intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to 
be accomplished through the device of districts containing 
widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is 
worth more in one district than in another would . . . run 
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic 
government . . . .77 
While the Court referred only to intrastate apportionment, at least some 
argue that the standard should or could be applied to interstate 
apportionment. Professor Jeffrey Ladewig, a well-known political science 
scholar, asserts: “There is nothing . . . within these cases that explicitly 
limits this constitutional requirement to state variations. The constitutional 
requirement is not ‘one person in one state, one vote in one state.’”78 
In fact, the Court in Wisconsin cited Wesberry in stating, 
“[C]onstitutional requirements make it impossible to achieve precise 
equality in voting power nationwide.”79 However, “the impossibility of 
achieving precise mathematical equality is no excuse for [the Federal 
Government] not making [the] mandated good-faith effort.”80 
Though the Court remains reluctant to formally rule on interstate 
apportionment, leaving the issue to Congress, it has at least moved in the 
direction of “one person, one vote” by stating such with regard to intrastate 
districts.  
E.  Justiciability 
Another dimension to these cases (in addition to equal representation) 
was justiciability, with the Court articulating new ideas about the Political 
                                                                                                                          
74 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
75 Id. at 2. 
76 Id. at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 Id. at 8. 
78 Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and 
Constitutional Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1140 (2011). 
79 Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 16 (1996). 
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Question Doctrine. 
Under Article III of the Constitution, “the judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority.”81 In Marbury v. Madison, the Court held, “questions in 
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted 
to the executive, can never be made in this court.”82 This formed the 
“Political Question Doctrine.”   
Current case law would support an interstate apportionment claim as 
justiciable, and not a matter of political question. In Baker v. Carr, the 
Court evaluated the justiciability of an intrastate malapportionment claim.83 
Baker argued, under the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Tennessee 
legislature’s failure to redistrict since 1901, following its 1900 census, 
deprived him of equal protection.84 The Court found that dismissing his 
complaint due to the political question doctrine would “be justified only if 
that claim were so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid 
of merit, or frivolous.”85 The Court noted that “the mere fact that the suit 
seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political 
question.”86 It went on to hold, “Appellants’ claim that they are being 
denied equal protection is justiciable, and if discrimination is sufficiently 
shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not 
diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.”87 
So, from Baker we learned not only that apportionment claims can be 
justiciable, but that they can be evaluated under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Two years later, in Wesberry, the Court once again visited the issue of 
political questions.88 In Wesberry, citizens of Georgia claimed population 
disparities between districts within the state “deprived them and voters 
similarly situated of a right under the Federal Constitution to have their 
votes for Congressmen given the same weight as the votes of other 
Georgians.”89 In upholding its ruling in Baker, the Wesberry Court found, 
“[t]he right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped.”90 
The issue of political questions arose in an interstate apportionment 
                                                                                                                          
81 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2. 
82 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). 
83 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
84 Id. at 199. 
85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
86 Id. at 209. 
87 Id. at 209–10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). This case overturned 
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), in which the Court held that challenges to 
apportionment of congressional districts raised only nonjusticiable political questions. 
88 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1964). 
89 Id. at 3. 
90 Id. at 7. 
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case as well.91 In U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana, the Court 
found that the issue was “political in the same sense that Baker v. Carr was 
a political case.”92 The Court went on to hold that “the interpretation of the 
apportionment provisions of the Constitution is well within the competence 
of the Judiciary.”93 
The Court has rightly left cases of apportionment open to the judiciary. 
The Baker Court found justiciability in malapportionment which resulted 
in discrimination. The plaintiffs had faced individual harms which could be 
remedied. Further, the Court found that they were protected under the 
Equal Protection Clause. Shutting down the judiciary to issues of 
apportionment would result in voters being subjected to discrimination 
without an avenue for relief. Professors Williams and MacDonald describe 
the holdings of Baker and Wesberry as decisions that “empower the 
citizenry to achieve boundless progress in the future by being able to vote 
effectively.”94 
Consistency demands that the courts take up the issue of interstate 
apportionment, and do so with the aim (or at least motivating desire) of 
equalizing district population. The Constitution uses the phrase “among the 
several states,”95 not “within” the several states. While the Court has left 
the matter of interstate apportionment to the discretion of Congress, the 
Court should rule on its constitutionality, based on the holdings in previous 
cases. In Wesberry, the Court relied on this wording when it applied a “one 
person, one vote” standard,96 leaving no reason to assume this should only 
apply to apportionment within states. On the contrary, more equality in 
interstate apportionment may rise to an even higher level of importance, 
since interstate apportionment affects who will become president.  
In Wesberry, the Court stated: 
A single Congressman represents from two to three times as 
many Fifth District voters as are represented by each of the 
Congressmen from the other Georgia congressional districts. 
The apportionment statute thus contracts the value of some 
votes and expands that of others. If the Federal Constitution 
intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress 
each vote be given as much weight as any other vote, then 
                                                                                                                          
91 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992). 
92 Id. at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and its Twelfth 
Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential 
Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 245 (1994). 
95 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
96 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
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this statute cannot stand.97 
There is no reason this standard should not be applied to interstate 
apportionment. In Wesberry’s most egregious instance, there was a 
difference of over 550,000 individuals between Georgia districts.98 If such 
a difference contracts the votes of some, then large differences in interstate 
district sizes must contract the votes of many.  
Citing to Wesberry, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims struck down 
malapportionment of the Alabama state legislature under the Equal 
Protection Clause.99 Chief Justice Warren wrote:  
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all 
citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative 
apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause 
guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all 
voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight 
of votes because of place of residence impairs basic 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as 
much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as 
race, or economic status.100  
While the Reynolds Court ruled only on apportionment as related to 
electing state legislators,101 the same logic can easily be applied to national 
elections. Fair and effective representation, as well as avoiding vote 
dilution, were clearly the Framers’ goals as they relate to federal elections 
as much as state elections.102 
Though a pure “one person one vote” standard may not be feasible in 
regard to interstate apportionment because not more than one 
representative can be apportioned per thirty thousand people, the inability 
for perfection does not reduce the necessity for striving for as close to 
equal district sizes as possible. A deviation of ten percent or less is 
accepted for districts voting for state legislatures.103 The Supreme Court 
has not presented justification for not applying a similar standard to 
interstate apportionment.104 The Court need not establish a ten percent limit 
                                                                                                                          
97 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
98 Id. at 2. 
99 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964). 
100 Id. at 565–66 (citations omitted). 
101 Id. at 566. 
102 See supra Part II.A–C.  
103 MARK JONATHAN MCKENZIE, BEYOND PARTISANSHIP? FEDERAL COURTS, STATE 
COMMISSIONS, AND REDISTRICTING 32–33 (2007) (discussing how the Court seems to have determined 
a ten percent (or smaller) deviation is generally accepted). 
104 The Court only said Congress should handle this issue and it would be impossible for 
exactness in interstate apportionment. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 464 
(1992) (“The constitutional framework that generated the need for compromise in the apportionment 
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on interstate malapportionment, but it should find a reasonable range that 
could be sustainable under the other proposed changes. Because some 
small states have only one district, which could throw off percentages, the 
Court should look at how far a state’s district sizes deviate from the 
average district size in determining the constitutionality of apportionment.  
Based on my proposals as applied to the 2000 census, the average 
district’s deviation from the average district size would be about seven 
percent.105 While our current system allows for a difference between the 
district sizes in Rhode Island and Montana of 466,792, had my method 
been applied in 2000, the largest disparity between district sizes would 
have been 264,778 (between North Dakota’s single district and South 
Dakota’s two districts). Fourteen states would have deviations from the 
average of less than ten thousand people. Thirty-five states would deviate 
by less than twenty-five thousand people; and only four states (including 
the District of Columbia and the single-district states of Vermont, North 
Dakota, and Alaska) would deviate by more than one hundred thousand 
people. If those three single district states and Washington D.C. are taken 
out of the equation, the average district size disparity is just over 21,254, or 
4.7% away from average. The average district size would also be cut down 
to 477,619 people. 
An interstate malapportionment challenge should not face opposition 
as it relates to the Political Question Doctrine. Though the Court has 
historically left the issue to Congress, Congress has failed to act. Because 
the Court was vehement in finding intrastate malapportionment unjust, it 
should rule the same way with regard to interstate malapportionment. 
Rather than look at disparities between states, the Court might find it easier 
in determining a cut off for deviations from the average district size of all 
states. Once the Court has made such a ruling, Congress will have to act to 
change how to apportion representatives. 
III.  PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
With such broadly constructed Constitutional requirements,106 
disagreement over apportionment in the twenty-first century is an 
inevitability. Three of the four requirements instruct only on a minimum 
and maximum number of representatives as well as restrict House districts 
from crossing state lines. The fourth requirement—that “[r]epresentatives 
shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
numbers”107—could lead to several different understandings. Pertinent 
                                                                                                                          
process must also delegate to Congress a measure of discretion that is broader than that accorded to the 
States in the much easier task of determining district sizes within state borders.”). 
105 See infra Part VI. 
106 Supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
107 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
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questions remain unanswered: Is it really acceptable to cap the House at 
435 representatives? For how long? How equal must interstate district sizes 
be? The Constitution makes no mention of interstate or intrastate 
apportionment, yet the Court has read into it a “one person one vote” 
standard.108 Currently, House representatives are technically apportioned 
among the states based on their respective numbers, though the differences 
between district sizes threatens the constitutionality of that 
apportionment—as the gaps in district sizes between states grow, the 
ability to claim that representatives are apportioned according to their 
numbers weakens. The lack of guidelines allows for a wide range of 
interpretation by both the Legislature and the Court. This lack of guidance 
also led to the passing of the Apportionment Act of 1911 and its century-
plus-long hold on the size of the House.  
As interstate apportionment proportionality decreases as a result of the 
minimal constitutional requirements, so does the accuracy in how we 
choose the president.109 Thomas Jefferson said: “No invasions of the 
Constitution are fundamentally so dangerous as the tricks played [by 
members of Congress] on their own numbers, apportionment, and other 
circumstances respecting themselves.”110 Leaving the cap on 
representatives at 435 inevitably results in (1) states with an unacceptably 
high, and not to mention growing, number of under-represented 
individuals; and (2) states with over-represented individuals.111 This 
mixture of states where individuals are over- and under-represented defies 
the “one person one vote” standard set out by the Court in Wesberry. 
Professor Ladewig points out, “after the 2000 reapportionment, one 
example of interstate malapportionment was more than 21 times greater 
than the intrastate malapportionment [previously] ruled 
unconstitutional.”112 
To John Adams, fairness in elections was essential. In his essay, 
Thoughts on Government, he wrote: 
The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be 
                                                                                                                          
108 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964) (discussing the Founders’ intention 
regarding Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution). 
109 This is due to widening gaps between the power residents of under- and over-represented 
states have in Washington D.C. and in the Electoral College.  
110 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Bill Apportioning Representation (Apr. 4, 1792), in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 500 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). 
111 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Matthew P. Jasinski, On the Causes and Consequences of and 
Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 89, 
93 (2008) (giving examples of states in which citizens are under- and over-represented). In fact, “The 
average discrepancy of the ten states with the smallest apportionment discrepancy was 3,796 
individuals; of the ten states with greatest apportionment discrepancy, 112,561 individuals: a difference 
of nearly 30 times.” Id. 
112 Id. 
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employed, in constituting this representative assembly. It 
should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. 
It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be 
the interest of this assembly to do strict justice at all times, it 
should be an equal representation, or, in other words, equal 
interests among the people should have equal interests in it. 
Great care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent 
unfair, partial, and corrupt elections.113 
At the Constitutional Convention debates (“Debates”), James Wilson 
said: “The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole 
Society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for 
the people to act collectively.”114 While James Madison championed 
fairness and proportionality in representation in The Federalist,115 Brutus 
did the same in The Anti-Federalist: “It is a matter of the highest 
importance, in forming this representation, that it be so constituted as to be 
capable of understanding the true interests of the society . . . . There is no 
possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation.”116 
During the Debates, James Madison said: “If the power is not immediately 
derived from the people in proportion to their numbers, we may make a 
paper confederacy, but that will be all.”117 
Given that the Framers intended proportional representation, and given 
the text of the Constitution,118 the fact that the legislature curbed the 
growth of the House of Representatives, as well as the ability for 
individuals to be proportionally represented, may not be entirely 
constitutional. When looking at the actual statistics, the issue becomes 
even more problematic. For example, the 2000 reapportionment resulted in 
each person’s vote from Montana being worth less than three-fifths of a 
person’s from Wyoming.119 Smaller states, in general, will face greater 
levels of malapportionment than larger states (whether that be by under- or 
over-representation).120  
As it currently stands, even medium-sized states are not proportionally 
represented. For example, based on the 2010 apportionment, North 
Carolina’s districts run about 23,000 people greater than the average, 
whereas South Carolina’s districts run about 49,000 people less than the 
                                                                                                                          
113 John Adams, Thoughts on Government 4:86–93, UNIV. CHICAGO, http://press-pubs.uchica 
go.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s5.html [http://perma.cc/78VM-5JMM] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
114 Frederick Upham Adams, The New Democracy, 3 NEW TIME 29, 32 (1898). 
115 Supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
116 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 382–83 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
117 Rule of Representation in the First Branch of the Legislature [29 June] 1787, supra note 1. 
118 The Fourteenth Amendment states, “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV (emphasis added).  
119 Ladewig, supra note 78, at 1131. 
120 Id. at 1132. 
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average district, for a total disparity between the Carolinas of 72,000 
people per district.121 A vote in Oregon is worth about eighty-six percent of 
a vote in Minnesota.122 Districts in Louisiana comprise about 46,000 more 
people than the average, and in Washington about 37,600 less, for a total 
disparity between the states of about 83,600 per district.123 And, of course, 
the disparities between small states are even more egregious. Districts in 
Iowa are made up of nearly 153,000 more individuals than districts in 
Nebraska.124 Delaware’s single district boasts 900,877 people, 187,902 
above average, while Vermont’s single district comprises 630,337, 82,600 
below average.125 The greatest disparity lies between Wyoming’s single 
district of 568,300 people and Montana’s single district of 994,416 people 
(a 426,116 difference).126 While the large states experience the least 
malapportionment, even the difference in district sizes between Florida and 
Ohio is about 23,000, and those states are made up of many more districts 
than the small states.127 So, each of Ohio’s sixteen districts are made up of 
23,000 fewer individuals than each of Florida’s twenty-seven districts. 
While an exact “one person one vote” standard with regard to interstate 
apportionment may, indeed, be unattainable, deliberately stopping the 
growth of the House, and therefore lessening the proportionality of 
representation, only serves to undercut that standard. 
And let us not forget the reason the House of Representatives exists: so 
that the people can be represented in government.128 During the Debates, 
George Mason said, “Representatives should sympathize with their 
constituents; [they] should think as they think, and feel as they feel.”129 As 
discussed previously, as district sizes increase, the ability for 
Representatives to know and adequately represent their constituents 
decreases.130 Further, with such a small group of representatives, special 
interest groups can buy the support of enough Representatives to pass bills 
                                                                                                                          
121 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 2. Note that the average district size is about 710,000. 
Id. 
122  
123Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/content/learn/ [http://perma.cc/ 
25TX-87H5] (last visited May 14, 2015) (“[E]ach representative is elected to a two-year term serving 
the people of a specific congressional district.”). 
129 JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE AND THE 
CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 43 (1993). 
130 See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 30 (quoting and discussing Daniel Webster’s Senate 
address, which emphasized the importance of as near proportional representation as possible); see also 
Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1006 (discussing the importance to early Americans of larger bodies of 
representation).  
 2015] PROPORTIONAL UNION OR PAPER CONFEDERACY? 615 
 
they support.131 One journalist argues that “[t]he House of Representatives 
has become another U.S. Senate where a rarefied few supposedly 
represents the needs of the many.”132 He asserts that the relatively small 
size of the House is “the main reason that hyper-partisanship and special 
interests seem to control the legislative agenda.”133  
Lack of proportionality also results in greater competition in states 
where district sizes are larger than the average.134 For example, 
constituents from Montana have to compete nearly twice as hard for their 
representative’s ear than constituents from Wyoming. Worse still, Montana 
and Wyoming border each other, so a person living next to the border on 
the Wyoming side will have more power in Washington than someone 
living just across the border on the Montana side. In 1977, Richard Fenno 
Jr. wrote about the problematic relationship between representatives and 
constituents.135 The 1970 census revealed a population of 203,302,031.136 
By 2010, the United States had more than 105 million more people than in 
1970, when such constituency problems were studied.137 Yet, despite a 
fifty percent increase in the U.S. population, the House has remained 
stagnant at 435 representatives.138 The average representative in 1970 
needed to understand constituencies of about 467,361 people.139 The 
average representative in 2010 represented 709,760 people.140 Recall that 
the average representative in the early twentieth century was expected to 
speak for just over 200,000 individuals, more than three times fewer than 
today.141  
Another problem with the current system is that apportionment is 
governed by a complicated mathematical formula, the Huntington-Hill 
                                                                                                                          
131 Brian Flynn, What’s Wrong with Congress? It’s Not Big Enough, CNN (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/opinion/flynn-expand-congress/ [http://perma.cc/NWT5-2J46]. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 See Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): 
Resuscitating a Federal Election System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991, 2024 n.162 (1993) (noting that 
constituents of a state with district sizes of 700,000 will have to compete seven times as hard for 
representation as a state with district sizes of 100,000). 
135 Richard F. Fenno Jr., U.S. House Members and Their Constituencies: An Exploration, 71 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 883, 887, 893, 894, 898, 900 (1977) (discussing various disconnects between 
representatives and their constituents, such as differentiating between who might and who might not 
vote for the representative, the amount of time representatives have to spend in their home districts, and 
viewing constituencies as homogenous). 
136 Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density: 1790 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/CSE5-
J225] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
137 Resident Population Data, supra note 40. 
138 The U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/ 
content/learn/ [http://perma.cc/L93Z-5XXM] (last updated Sept. 22, 2015). 
139 203,302,031 divided by 435 equals 467,360.9908. 
140 308,745,538 divided by 435 equals 709,759.8575. 
141 See supra Part II.C. 
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Method (“Hill Method”) that is not intuitive and that can lead to bias. The 
Hill Method requires first dividing the population by the number of 
representatives.142 Using 2010 data, the solution to this equation is 
709,759.8575. The population of each state is then divided by this 
number.143 Each state is assigned an “upper quotient” and “lower quotient.” 
Next, one must determine each state’s geometric mean.144 This is done by 
first multiplying the upper and lower quotient by each other, and then 
taking the square root of the product.145 If the geometric mean is less than 
the quotient, the state gets an additional representative, but if the geometric 
mean is greater than the quotient, the state rounds down. Consider the 
following table featuring four states as examples: 
 
State Population Quotient Lower 
Quot. 
Upper 
Quot. 
Geom. 
Mean 
Seats 
App’d 
Calif.  37,253,956 52.488 52 53 52.498 52 
Ga. 9,687,653 13.65 13 14 13.49 14 
Iowa 3,046,355 4.29 4 5 4.47 4 
Mont. 989,415 1.39 1 2 1.73 1 
 
Table 1 
 
But what if, after determining how many seats each state should be 
apportioned, the total number does not come out to 435? In that case, one 
must find a modified divisor by trial and error until the correct number of 
seats is found.146 
While we currently use the Hill Method, this has not always been the 
case. Changes in the use of apportionment methods have largely been 
politically motivated. Complaints that one method affected northern states 
differently than southern states were succeeded by complaints that another 
method affected large states differently than small states.147 Using an 
apportionment method that lacks bias is the apolitical and fair solution. 
Keeping the House from gaining more than 435 seats may have even 
more consequences than poor representation. Professor Gaughan et al. 
                                                                                                                          
142 Methods of Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/ 
reference/apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html [http://perma.cc/DG9R-MZ6F] (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2015).  
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Apportionment Methods, U. ALA., http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/apportionment/appmeth.htm 
[http://perma.cc/UGL7-U569] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
147 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 35 (“The United States congressional debates of 1792 
through 1832 were largely fired by sectional and political self-interest in the face of growth and of 
relative shifts in population.”). 
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claim that the 435-seat cap allows “federal apportionment law [to] aid[] 
and abet[] partisan gerrymandering.”148 For example, in the 2010 election, 
more people voted for Democratic candidates than Republicans, yet 
Republicans won the House due to gerrymandering.149 
Our current method of apportionment fails to proportionally represent 
the people, as it was intended to do, resulting in a lack of fairness and 
accuracy. Representatives are expected to understand the needs of twelve 
times as many constituents as when the country was founded.150 Other 
consequences, like partisan gerrymandering, infect the integrity of the 
system. A solution would return to the Framers’ vision by increasing 
accuracy and fairness through proportionality. 
IV.  MODERNIZING APPORTIONMENT TO REFLECT THE FRAMERS’ GOALS 
In this Part, I discuss the two main steps Congress should take in order 
to improve interstate apportionment. In Part V, I discuss further solutions 
that build upon these two core solutions. 
A.  Two Steps to Greater Proportionality 
First, the Cube Root Law should govern the number of representatives 
in the House. Recall that under the Cube Root Law, the number of 
representatives should be approximately equal to the cubed root of the total 
population.151 This equation expedites efficiency while not overwhelming 
the House with a directly proportional number of representatives.152 In 
2010, the total U.S. population was 308,745,538.153 The rounded cubed 
root of this population is 676.154  
Implementing the Cube Root Law requires only repealing Section 1 of 
the Apportionment Act of 1911155 and passing a new, up to date, 
apportionment act. A constitutional amendment would also work, but a 
statute is preferable for procedural reasons because a statute is easier and 
                                                                                                                          
148 Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1025; see also H. Peyton Young, Dividing the House: Why 
Congress Should Reinstate an Old Reapportionment Formula, BROOKINGS POL’Y BRIEF SERIES (Aug. 
2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/08/politics-young [http://perma.cc/65YA-R6 
MN] (arguing that politics play a part in choosing apportionment methods). 
149 See Dana Milbank, Republicans’ Stacked Deck in the House, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2013, at 
A15 (asserting that, due to redistricting, the “Republican House majority is impervious to the will of 
the electorate”). 
150 Supra Part II.C. 
151 BRIAN FREDERICK, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION & CONSTITUENTS: THE CASE FOR 
INCREASING THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15 (2010). 
152 Id. at 15–16. For a longer discussion of the Cube Root Law, see FREDERICK, supra note 151. 
Notably, if the House was assigned one seat per 30,000 people, there would be 10,291 representatives. 
153 Resident Population Data, supra note 40. 
154 Taking the cubed root of 308,745,538 results in 675.875799983, which would be rounded up 
to 676. 
155 Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, § 1, 37 Stat 13, 13–14. 
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more likely to pass. Moreover, should future legislators find reason to 
change the method of apportionment to suit their modern needs, they 
would find it easier to repeal such a statute and create their own 
apportionment act than to pass and ratify a new constitutional amendment. 
My second proposal is to replace the Hill Method with the simpler, 
fairer, and more intuitive Webster Method. The Webster Method requires 
first determining a standard divisor by dividing the U.S. population by the 
number of representatives.156 Then, each state’s population is divided by 
the standard divisor.157 The solutions are simply rounded up or down.158 In 
the following table, I show the results of applying the Cube Root Law and 
the Webster Method to the 2000 House of Representatives. Using the Cube 
Root Law would result in a House of approximately 655 representatives.159 
 
State Pop/Div State Pop/Div 
Alabama 10.35551 Montana 2.10085 
Alaska 1.45987 Nebraska 3.98484 
Arizona 11.94718 Nevada 4.65313 
Arkansas 6.22527 New Hampshire 2.87765 
California 78.87349 New Jersey 19.59364 
Colorado 10.01591 New Mexico 4.23582 
Connecticut 7.93019 New York 44.18856 
Delaware 1.83114 North Carolina 18.74362 
Florida 37.21650 North Dakota 1.49542 
Georgia 19.06296 Ohio 26.43691 
Hawaii 2.82118 Oklahoma 8.03518 
Idaho 3.01310 Oregon 7.96706 
Illinois 28.91955 Pennsylvania 28.59765 
Indiana 14.15901 Rhode Island 2.44111 
Iowa 6.81423 South Carolina 9.34236 
Kansas 6.26053 South Dakota 1.75772 
Kentucky 9.41165 Tennessee 13.24805 
Louisiana 10.40645 Texas 48.55553 
Maine 2.96878 Utah 5.20015 
Maryland 12.33339 Vermont 1.41771 
Massachusetts 14.78450 Virginia 16.48302 
Michigan 23.14265 Washington 13.72504 
Minnesota 11.45549 West Virginia 4.21090 
                                                                                                                          
156 Methods of Apportionment, supra note 35. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Resident Population Data, supra note 40. The cubed root of the 2000 population, 281,421,906, 
is 655.318809119, which can be rounded down to 655. 
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Mississippi 6.62406 Wisconsin 12.48984 
Missouri 13.02900 Wyoming 1.14982 
  DC 1.33209 
 
Table 2160 
 
After rounding up and down, the final representative count for each 
state would be as follows: 
 
State Reps. State Reps. 
Alabama 10 Montana 2
Alaska 1 Nebraska 4
Arizona 12 Nevada 5
Arkansas 6 New Hampshire 3
California 79 New Jersey 20
Colorado 10 New Mexico 4
Connecticut 8 New York 44
Delaware 2 North Carolina 19
Florida 37 North Dakota 1
Georgia 19 Ohio 26
Hawaii 3 Oklahoma 8
Idaho 3 Oregon 8
Illinois 29 Pennsylvania 29
Indiana 14 Rhode Island 2
Iowa 7 South Carolina 9
Kansas 6 South Dakota 2
Kentucky 9 Tennessee 13
Louisiana 10 Texas 49
Maine 3 Utah 5
Maryland 12 Vermont 1
Massachusetts 15 Virginia 16
Michigan 23 Washington 14
Minnesota 11 West Virginia 4
Mississippi 7 Wisconsin 12
Missouri 13 Wyoming 1
                                                                                                                          
160 Though the District of Columbia has a delegate in the House of Representatives, it does not get 
a vote in the House, nor does it have any senators because it is not a state. Directory of Representatives, 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/representatives/ [http://perma.cc/ZU2H-
GGBJ] (last visited May 8, 2015); DC.GOV, http://dc.gov/page/statehood [http://perma.cc/9B48-
RBNG] (last visited May 8, 2015). However, under the Twenty-Third Amendment, D.C. is given at 
least three Electoral College votes, and no more than the smallest state. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, 
§ 1. 
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  DC 1
Total   651
 
Table 3 
 
Though the total number of representatives is 651, rather than 655, this 
is not a problem under the Webster Method. If the total number of 
representatives does not come out to the pre-determined House size, no 
refiguring is necessary. Alternatively, if the total number after rounding 
had come to 660, the House would have 660 representatives. The Webster 
Method allows a flexibility that does not exist in the Hill Method. 
This basic arithmetic approach of the Webster Method is more 
accessible to the general public than the complicated Hill Method. Even 
Canada’s method of apportionment resembles Webster’s. A large part of 
Canada’s apportionment method requires finding a quotient, dividing the 
population by the quotient, and rounding up for decimals of 0.5 or 
greater.161 The Webster Method, also known as the “Sainte-Lague” 
method, is used in Germany, as well.162 It was used in the United States 
from 1842–1852 and 1901–1941, and at least considered in the years in 
between.163     
Most importantly, the Webster method is considered to lack all bias.164 
It is also unlikely to break quota.165 Balinski and Young argue that “it 
should not be possible to transfer a seat from one state to another and bring 
both nearer to their true quotas . . . [m]athematical analysis proves that the 
only divisor method that meets this requirement is Webster’s.”166 The 
method currently used, the Hill Method, is more likely to result in bias.167 
For these reasons, Balinski and Young make a persuasive case for 
returning to the Webster Method. 
For purposes of efficiency, a requirement that apportionment be based 
on the Webster Method should be part of the same new apportionment act 
providing for a House size based on the Cubed Root Law. 
                                                                                                                          
161 The House of Commons and Its Members, supra note 47.  
162 ELECTION OF MEMBERS AND THE ALLOCATIONS OF SEATS, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, http:// 
www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/elections/arithmetic [http://perma.cc/MV7J-2KE8] (last visited 
May 14, 2015). 
163 A Little History, UNIV. ALA., http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/apportionment/apphisty.htm 
[http://perma.cc/WL28-LJUD] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
164 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 85; Paul H. Edelman, Getting the Math Right: Why 
California Has Too Many Seats in the House of Representatives, 59 VAND. L. REV. 297, 340 (2006). 
165 Edelman, supra note 164, at 339. 
166 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 85. 
167 Id. at 86. 
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B.  My Proposals and the Constitutional Framework 
The Constitution puts no maximum on the size of the House other than 
that there cannot be more than one representative for every thirty thousand 
people. Following the Cube Root Law could not mathematically result in a 
violation of this requirement. In order to implement this change, only the 
Apportionment Act of 1911 would have to be repealed, and a new 
apportionment act passed. Webster’s method of apportionment has been 
used before and no law currently forbids it from being used again.168 A 
comprehensive new apportionment act would repeal Section 1 of the 
Apportionment Act of 1911, require the number of representatives in the 
House to reflect the cubed root of the population, and require usage of 
Webster’s method for apportioning representatives. Should these methods 
be implemented, Congress would currently have 676 representatives in the 
House,169 with an average district size of 456,724.170 That is a 35.7% 
increase in representation.171 Notably, the United Kingdom maintains a 
lower chamber of 650 representatives for a population of only 64.1 
million.172 Repealing Section 1 of the Apportionment Act of 1911 and 
passing a new act increasing the size of the House to more adequately and 
proportionally represent the people would allow a suffocating system to 
breathe. 
The Apportionment Act of 1911 consists of five parts.173 Section 1 
mandates a cap on the House at 433 representatives, with Section 2 
allowing for two more upon Arizona’s and New Mexico’s admittance to 
the union.174 Section 3 requires that representatives “shall be elected by 
districts composed of a contiguous and compact territory, and containing 
as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”175 Section 4 
provides that if a state’s number of representatives is increased, the 
additional representatives will be elected at large until redistricting 
occurs.176 Finally, Section 5 states that any representatives in the at-large 
election will be nominated in the same manner as the governor.177 
                                                                                                                          
168 See A Little History, supra note 163 (providing a timeline of the use of each apportionment 
method). 
169 See supra note 154. 
170 308,745,538 (population) divided by 676 (representatives) equals 456,724.17 people per 
representative. 
171 456,724.17 divided by 709,759.86 equals 64.35%. One hundred percent minus 64.35% equals 
35.7%. 
172 Population and Migration, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/compendiums/compendium-of-uk-statistics/population-and-migration/index.html [http://perma 
.cc/Z6AK-2SWG] (last updated June 5, 2014). 
173 Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat 13. 
174 Id. §§ 1–2. 
175 Id. § 3. 
176 Id. § 4. 
177 Id. § 5. 
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Section 1 shows apportionment, once again, being dictated by 
politics—this time in a battle between urban and rural states.178 Gaughan 
notes that “in the decade before the 1920 census, approximately six million 
people moved from rural to urban areas.”179 As more people moved into 
cities, and the nation changed from agrarian to urban, increasing the size of 
the House threatened to reduce the power of rural states.180 Further, while 
representatives cited a shortage of office space and supplies as reason to 
halt the House’s growth, evidence suggests that this was not the case, and 
in fact, the House ran more efficiently than the Senate.181 
Sections 3 through 5 need not be altered for my proposal to take effect. 
Only Section 1, imposing the first-ever cap on the number of House 
representatives, should be repealed by a new apportionment act. The size 
of the House of Representatives is important for more than just 
congressional representation. There is also the matter of the Electoral 
College. In the next Part I discuss the implications of my solution to the 
Electoral College. 
V.  THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PROPORTIONALITY 
The number of representatives apportioned to each state determines 
that state’s voting power in the Electoral College. Currently, only two 
small states, one generally conservative and one generally liberal, split 
their Electoral College votes.182 In the spirit of proportional representation, 
all states, and the District of Columbia, should split their Electoral College 
votes based on the votes of the people.  
A.  Electoral College Vote-Splitting 
Because electors are awarded based on a state’s number of senators 
and representatives, the Electoral College can be viewed as an amalgam of 
federalism and “majoritarianism.”183 This mirrors the nation’s 
bicameralism and the Framers’ careful balancing of small and large states’ 
interests. 
Each state’s Electoral College votes should be split in a manner that 
                                                                                                                          
178 See Christopher M. Straw, The Role of Electoral Accountability in the Madisonian Machine, 
11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 339–41 (2008) (discussing the effect of the shift in rural to 
urban domination in the 1920s). 
179 Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1011. 
180 See id. at 1011–12 (discussing the effects of a decreasingly rural nation on apportionment). 
181 Straw, supra note 178, at 344–47. 
182 See Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska, 270 TO WIN, http://www.270towin.com/ 
content/split-electoral-votes-maine-and-nebraska/#.VTMLzfDCfSM [http://perma.cc/5J5G-YWLU] 
(last visited May 7, 2015) (explaining the electoral process in both Maine and Nebraska). 
183 Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the 
Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 193 (2011). For a more robust defense of the 
Electoral College, see generally id. 
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reflects the state’s popular vote. For example, consider a state with twelve 
votes, and its percentage of popular votes for the Democrats, Republicans, 
and a third party, respectively, is 56 to 42 to 2. Those twelve votes would 
be multiplied by each percentage, resulting in: 6.72 to 5.04 to 0.24, which 
would leave the state with seven votes for the Democratic candidate, five 
votes for the Republican candidate, and zero votes for the third party 
candidate. Consider a state with seventy votes. Perhaps that state’s popular 
vote for the Democrats, Republicans, and the third party, respectively, is 
44 to 51 to 5. This would result in: 30.8 to 35.7 to 3.5. The Democratic 
candidate would receive thirty-one votes, the Republican thirty-six, and the 
third party three. (Since 0.8 and 0.7 are both greater than 0.5, the two extra 
votes would be granted, one each, to the Republican and Democrat 
candidates.) 
1.  Effect on States 
Large blocs of votes have “power beyond [their] numbers.”184 
Electoral College vote-splitting not only allows for greater equality in 
interstate apportionment and representation, but it also allows minority 
voters to feel like their votes matter, because they do.185 For example, 
consider a state like Texas, with a traditionally Republican majority, or one 
like California, with a traditionally Democratic majority. Democrats in 
Texas and Republicans in California may feel like their votes do not count 
or their voices are not heard.186 Allowing minority parties in heavily 
Democratic or Republican states, like Texas or California, to garner 
Electoral College votes will not only allow more citizens to feel 
represented, but should make candidates care more about representing the 
greatest number of people. Currently, neither party sees reason for 
vigorous campaigning in heavily partisan states.187 But if the Republican 
                                                                                                                          
184 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 9.  
185 See, e.g., Benjamin A. Schoenkin, Proposed Bill Would Change Electoral Vote System in 
Nebraska, DAILY NEBRASKAN (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.dailynebraskan.com/news/proposed-bill-
would-change-electoral-vote-system-in-nebraska/article_fee09204-acec-11e4-a446-fbd95a04c488.html 
[http://perma.cc/DE86-LU2J] (emphasis added) (quoting a university history student expressing that a 
winner-takes-all system in Nebraska will likely result in a decrease of young voter turnout). 
186 See, e.g., Ina Jaffe, In California, “Republican” Is Becoming a Toxic Label, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/11/16/165216636/in-california-
republican-is-becoming-a-toxic-label (discussing how California has become more Democratic over the 
years, making it difficult for Republicans to win office); Bud Kennedy, For Texas Democrats, the Bad 
News Gets Worse, STAR TELEGRAM (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/opn-
columns-blogs/bud-kennedy/article3887266.html [http://perma.cc/NAT3-YHQ2] (discussing Texas’s 
history of conservativism, and the difficulty securing Democratic wins). 
187 During the 2012 presidential campaign, there were zero campaign stops in North Dakota or 
Kansas; there were 45, 19, 52, and 25 in California, New York, Texas, and Massachusetts respectively; 
and 115, 148, and 98 in Florida, Ohio, and Virginia, respectively. Presidential Campaign Stops: Who’s 
Going Where, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-presidential-
campaign-visits/ [http://perma.cc/NR66-3CBA] (last visited Dec. 1, 2015). 
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candidate can snatch up some New York votes, both candidates are 
incentivized to campaign in New York—the Republicans to grab as many 
Electoral College votes as possible, and the Democrats to retain as many 
Electoral College votes as possible.  
Further, the hyper-focus on “battleground” states like Florida and Ohio 
will wane. While candidates tend to spend a lot of time in these states,188 
hoping to win even a slight majority of the large chunks of Electoral 
College votes,189 they could be spending more time in states visited less 
often, knowing that, for example, a state like Florida, with the fourth 
highest Electoral College vote count, will dole out its votes to two or three 
candidates, rather than as a winner-takes-all bloc. Rather than Florida 
giving its entire bloc of votes to one candidate, its votes could be split 
almost evenly. Because these states still offer high Electoral College vote 
counts,190 they are not at risk of becoming altogether unimportant; rather, 
their importance will more closely resemble traditionally more partisan 
states. 
Messy battles over small numbers of votes could also be curbed by 
splitting Electoral College votes. In 2000, for example, though nearly six 
million people voted in Florida, the difference between votes for Al Gore 
and votes for George W. Bush was only 537. In my system, discussed in 
Part V.A.4–5 below, Bush and Gore would both have received nineteen of 
thirty-nine votes, leaving the final Electoral College vote for Ralph Nader, 
who received a small portion of Florida’s vote. In this way, generally all 
Floridians would have been represented in proportion to how they voted. 
Instead, the battle over those 537 plus votes turned into a U.S. Supreme 
Court case.191 Nine thousand votes in the liberal county of Miami-Dade 
had gone uncounted due to voting machines not detecting a vote for 
president.192 Another 110,000 were over-voted.193 That is not to say that 
application of my solution would have stopped the recount or the Supreme 
                                                                                                                          
188 Id. 
189 For example, despite Florida offering less Electoral College votes than California, Texas, and 
New York, there were more than twice as many campaign stops in Florida than the latter states during 
the 2012 presidential election. Id. There were 148 campaign stops in Ohio and 19 in Texas. Id. 
190 For example, Florida currently has twenty-nine Electoral College votes. Distribution of 
Electoral College Votes, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral 
-college/allocation.html [http://perma.cc/4A6G-GCJ5] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). Even if Florida’s 
Electoral College votes were to be split in half, with the remainder going to a third party candidate, 
each major party would still receive fourteen votes. 
191 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that Florida’s “safe harbor” recount 
process was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
192 Id. at 102. 
193 Id. at 108. An over-vote occurs “when a voter makes more than the permitted number of 
selections in a single race/contest or when a voter makes a selection in a race/contest on which he/she 
was not eligible to vote.” Overvotes and Undervotes,  ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/2004%20EAVS%20Chapter%208.pdf [http://perma.cc/SU 
47-CX6L] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Court decision. Rather, the real benefit would be the splitting of the votes. 
Giving all of Florida’s Electoral College votes to Bush ignored the wishes 
of a nearly equal amount of Gore supporters. Because the Supreme Court 
did not allow the recount to continue,194 we may never know the exact 
amount of votes for each candidate. Given that Miami-Dade County leans 
left,195 however, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the majority 
of uncounted votes would have gone to Gore, propelling him ahead of 
Bush and securing for him the large chunk of Florida Electoral College 
votes which would have won him the election. In any event, had 
everything gone the same except that my method had been used, the 
Electoral College votes would have been split, and the controversy over the 
large chunk of Florida votes going to the candidate who may not actually 
have won Florida’s popular vote would not exist. 
2. Increase in Third-Party Contenders 
Later in this Part, I apply my method to the 1992 and 2000 elections. 
One important result of this application is that, in 2000, the third-party 
candidate would have won sixteen Electoral College votes (as opposed to 
the zero that he actually won), and in the 1992 election, the third-party 
candidate would have won just over eighteen percent of the Electoral 
College vote, similar to the amount of the popular vote that he won.196 
Nearly sixty percent of Americans feel that the two-party system is a 
hindrance.197 If third parties could garner Electoral College votes, it might 
open our system to more than just the two parties—both of which are 
unpopular.198 Added competition could spur greater instances of debate and 
                                                                                                                          
194 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (“Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional 
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy.”). 
195 See, e.g., Final Cumulative Report, MIAMI-DADE CNTY. ELECTIONS, http://www.miami 
dade.gov/elections/results/ele110204/cumu110204.pdf [http://perma.cc/LED7-9H6Y] (last visited Aug. 
22, 2015) (showing that John Kerry won 52.9% of the vote in Miami-Dade County in 2004); Miami-
Dade County Elections, CLARITY ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/FL/Dade/42008/ 
113201/en/summary.html [http://perma.cc/TRJ5-Q4SZ] (last updated Nov. 20, 2012) (showing that 
Barack Obama won 61.58% of the vote in Miami-Dade County in 2012); Miami-Dade County 
Elections, CLARITY ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/FL/Dade/8930/14419/en/summ 
ary.html [http://perma.cc/7KXA-4BSR] (last updated Dec. 30, 2008) (showing that Barack Obama won 
57.81% of the vote in Miami-Dade County in 2008). 
196 See infra Part V.A.4. (showing that Ross Perot would have won 18.86% as a third-party 
candidate in the 1992 presidential election). 
197 Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Continue to Say a Third Political Party Is Needed, GALLUP (Sept. 
24, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/177284/americans-continue-say-third-political-party-needed 
.aspx. 
198 In recent years, both parties have consistently had approval ratings of under fifty percent. See, 
e.g., Andrew Dugan, Democratic Party Favorable Rating Falls to Record Low, GALLUP (Nov. 12, 
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179345/democratic-party-favorable-rating-falls-record-low.aspx 
2014 (noting that the Democratic Party’s favorable rating is at thirty-six percent and the Republican 
Party’s favorable rating is at forty-two percent). 
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force candidates of the two major parties to listen more closely to the will 
of the people, which they currently do not seem to do.199 Further, the 
classic argument that voting for a third party is analogous to voting for the 
candidate one likes least would hold less water if people see that third-
party candidates truly have a chance of winning. If third parties can take 
Electoral College votes away from the two major parties, Democrats and 
Republicans would have to alter their platforms.200  
Under the existing system, it is not surprising that many people who 
would otherwise vote for a third party choose not to vote. Consider the 
1992 election. Independent candidate Ross Perot received nearly twenty 
percent of the popular vote, but zero Electoral College votes.201 That means 
that almost one-fifth of the voting public wanted Perot for president, yet 
that fifth of the country was not represented at all in the Electoral College. 
Less egregious, but still inaccurate, was the election of 1912 when 
Progressive candidate Theodore Roosevelt won almost 30% of the popular 
vote, coming in second place, but only 16.6% of the Electoral College 
vote.202 Conversely, Woodrow Wilson won 41.8% of the popular vote, but 
a whopping 81.9% of the Electoral College vote.203 In 1992, Perot became 
the most successful third-party candidate since Roosevelt, eighty years 
earlier. Despite the popular opinion that third parties would benefit our 
democratic system,204 no third-party candidate has recreated Roosevelt’s or 
Perot’s success since.  
3. Implementing Electoral College Vote-Splitting 
Because each state determines how its electors are chosen and how 
they are to vote,205 the states must choose Electoral College vote-splitting. 
For reasons previously discussed, voters in states which generally go either 
left or right would benefit from vote-splitting. If enough liberal- and 
conservative-leaning states enact laws requiring vote-splitting, large swing 
                                                                                                                          
199 See, e.g., Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 575 (“[T]he preferences of the average 
American appear to have only a miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public 
policy.”). 
200 See Keith Darren Eisner, Comment, Non-Major-Party Candidates and Televised Presidential 
Debates: The Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 983–85 (1993) (discussing the 
myriad ways third parties have influenced public policy, social change, and major party platforms). 
201 Election of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection 
.php?year=1992 [http://perma.cc/B64C-LYYP] (last visited May 8, 2015). 
202 Election of 1912, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection 
.php?year=1912 [http://perma.cc/56CK-XXWX] (last visited May 8, 2015). 
203 Id. 
204 Jones, supra note 197. 
205 Who are the Electors?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/electors.html [http://perma.cc/7DY4-EU8J] (last visited May 7, 2015). 
 2015] PROPORTIONAL UNION OR PAPER CONFEDERACY? 627 
 
states will eventually follow.206 Currently, two states—Nebraska and 
Maine—split their votes.207 In fact, despite being a generally conservative 
state,208 Nebraska cast one of its Electoral College votes for Barack Obama 
in 2008 when the Omaha area voted Democratic.209 Vote-splitting is not a 
new experiment to these states, either; Nebraska’s law has required vote-
splitting since 1992, and Maine’s since 1972.210 In fact, three separate 
attempts at overturning this method of voting have been defeated in 
Nebraska.211 Because in sixty percent of states voters have changed their 
choice of party in subsequent presidential elections,212 it is likely that these 
states would see vote-splitting as beneficial. In the winner-takes-all system, 
large states remain at a disadvantage, often going ignored by candidates.213 
Nebraska provides an example of a small state that benefitted from vote-
splitting, since then-candidate Obama campaigned in a state that otherwise 
would have gone ignored by a Democratic candidate.214 Because choosing 
a proportional Electoral College vote system would increase the 
representation of voters in every state, all fifty states and Washington, D.C. 
should enact this method.  
In the following two examples, I demonstrate how the 1992 and 2000 
elections would have turned out had we used the Cube Root Law, the 
Webster Method, and Electoral College vote-splitting. 
4. The Presidential Election of 2000 
The infamous 2000 presidential election resulted in a candidate being 
elected to the presidency who did not win a majority or plurality of the 
                                                                                                                          
206 This is because swing states will become less important on the campaign trail if previously 
conservative and liberal states can be split; there will be less emphasis on competing for swing state 
votes if a conservative candidate can take votes from a liberal state (or a liberal candidate from a 
conservative state). 
207 Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska, supra note 182. 
208 Walter Hickey, And Now Here Are the Most Conservative States in America . . ., BUS. INSIDER 
(Feb. 4, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-conservative-states-2013-2 
[http://perma.cc/AS3G-QHWQ] (naming Nebraska as the ninth most conservative state). 
209 Mitch Smith, Blue Dot for Obama Prompts Red Nebraska to Revisit Electoral College Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2015, at A11.  
210 Stacy Conradt, Why Do Nebraska and Maine Split Electoral Votes?, MENTAL FLOSS (Nov. 7, 
2012, 1:30 PM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/13017/why-do-nebraska-and-maine-split-electoral-votes 
[http://perma.cc/F2WX-8NA3]. 
211 Id. 
212 Vincy Fon, Electoral College Alternatives and U.S. Presidential Elections, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 41, 68 (2004). 
213 See, e.g., Craig J. Herbst, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with 
the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 246 (2012) (noting that Texas has been ignored in 
presidential campaigns since 1980). 
214 See Jean Ortiz, Obama Wins Nebraska Electoral Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2008, 5:12 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/14/obama-wins-nebraska-elect_n_143924.html [http:// 
perma.cc/545A-AQYN] (noting that the first time in history that Nebraska split its votes was also the 
first time in forty-four years that a Democrat won one of its electoral votes).  
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popular vote.215 In a survey taken seven years after the 2000 election, 
seventy-two percent of respondents said they would support abolishing the 
Electoral College in favor of a national popular vote.216  
In 2000, Republican George W. Bush ran against Democrat Al Gore 
and Green Party candidate Ralph Nader.217 Though Gore won the popular 
vote by over half a million votes, Bush took the presidency by winning 271 
Electoral College votes (as opposed to Gore’s 266).218 Despite nearly three 
million people voting for him, Nader did not receive any Electoral College 
votes.219  
The 2000 census revealed a population of 281,421,906.220 Taking the 
cubed root of that population results in a House of 655 representatives.221 
The following table shows what the results would have been had my 
proposal been implemented in 2000. 
 
State Bush Gore Nader State Bush Gore Nader 
Ala.  7 5 0 Nebr. 4 2 0 
Alaska 2 1 0 Nev. 4 3 0 
Ariz. 7 6 1 N.H. 3 2 0 
Ark. 4 4 0 N.J. 9 12 1 
Calif. 34 43 3 N.Mex. 3 3 0 
Colo. 6 5 1 N.Y. 16 28 2 
Conn. 4 6 0 N.C. 12 9 0 
Del. 2 2 0 N.Dak. 2 1 0 
Fla. 19 19 1 Ohio 14 13 1 
Ga. 12 9 0 Okla. 6 4 0 
                                                                                                                          
215 See 2000 Presidential Election, Popular Vote Totals, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2000/popular_vote.html [http://perma.cc/ 
WYM7-CZGL] (last visited May 7, 2015) (showing that George W. Bush received 50,456,062 votes 
and Al Gore received 50,996,582 votes). 
216 WASH. POST KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARV. UNIV., SURVEY OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENTS 
12–13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/independents/post-kaiser-harvard-
topline.pdf [http://perma.cc/5G8P-VBT9] (last visited Dec. 1, 2015). 
217 2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm [http://perma.cc/JSP8-NRWY] (last updated Dec. 
2001). Other candidates will not be considered here, as they did not garner enough votes to have 
received Electoral College votes. 
218 2000 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/votes/2000.html [http://perma.cc/UYW3-UVDY] (last visited May 8, 2015). 
219 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary for All Candidates Listed on at Least One State 
Ballot, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/prespop.htm [http://perma.cc/9D 
AT-4EEE] (last updated Dec. 2001) [hereinafter 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary]; Electoral 
Vote Totals, 2000 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/votes/2000.html [http://perma.cc/ZBC4-QFFM] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
220 Census 2000 Gateway, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/www/ 
cen2000.html [http://perma.cc/AZ8R-HSP5] (last visited May 8, 2015). 
221 The cubed root of 281,421,906 is 655.318809119, which can be rounded down to 655. 
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Hawaii 2 3 0 Oreg. 5 5 0 
Idaho 3 2 0 Pa. 14 16 1 
Ill. 13 17 1 R.I. 1 3 0 
Ind. 9 7 0 S.C. 6 5 0 
Iowa 4 5 0 S.Dak. 2 2 0 
Kans. 5 3 0 Tenn. 8 7 0 
Ky. 6 5 0 Tex. 30 20 1 
La. 6 6 0 Utah 5 2 0 
Maine 2 3 0 Vt. 1 2 0 
Md. 6 8 0 Va. 10 8 0 
Mass. 6 10 1 Wash. 7 8 1 
Mich. 12 13 0 W.Va. 3 3 0 
Minn. 6 6 1 Wis. 7 7 0 
Miss. 5 4 0 Wyo. 2 1 0 
Mo. 8 7 0 DC 0 3 0 
Mont. 3 1 0 Total 367 369 16 
 
Table 4 
 
As Table 4 shows, Gore would have won with a plurality of the 
Electoral College votes, which matches his plurality win of the popular 
vote. The third-party candidate, Nader, would also have had a chance to 
win Electoral College votes. Nader won 2.74% of the popular vote.222 
Under our current system, he was awarded zero Electoral College votes.223 
Under my method, he would have won 2.13% of the Electoral College 
votes. In the real 2000 election, Bush won 47.87% of the popular vote and 
50.47% of the Electoral College vote.224 Gore won 48.38% of the popular 
vote and 49.53% of the Electoral College vote.225 Under my method, Bush 
would have received 48.8% of the Electoral College vote, and Gore the 
remaining 49.07%. These results much more closely mirror the actual 
election results and the will of the people. Gore’s plurality win in the 
Electoral College would have matched his plurality success with the 
popular vote. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
222 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary, supra note 219. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
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5. The Presidential Election of 1992 
In 1992, Republican George H.W. Bush ran against Democrat Bill 
Clinton and independent Ross Perot.226 Clinton won 43% of the popular 
vote and 68.8% of the Electoral College vote.227 Bush won 37.4% of the 
popular vote and 31.2% of the Electoral College vote.228 Perot won 18.9% 
of the popular vote and zero Electoral College votes.229 If my method had 
been in place at the time, the House would have had 635 representatives.230 
Accounting for the Electoral College votes attributable to Senate seats, the 
total Electoral College votes would have been 737. The following table 
shows how, based on the 1992 popular vote, the Electoral College votes 
would have been counted. 
 
State Bush Clinton Perot State Bush Clinton Perot 
Ala. 6 5 1 Nebr. 3 2 1 
Alaska 1 1 1 Nev. 2 2 1 
Ariz. 4 4 3 N.H. 2 2 1 
Ark. 3 4 1 N.J. 9 10 3 
Calif. 25 36 16 N.M. 2 3  1 
Colo. 4 4 2 N.Y. 16 23 8 
Conn. 4 4 2 N.C. 8 8 3 
Del. 1 2 1 N.D. 2 1 1 
Fla. 14 14 7 Ohio 11 12 6 
Ga. 8 8 2 Okla. 4 4 2 
Hawaii 2 2 1 Oreg. 3 4 2 
Idaho 2 2 1 Pa. 12 14 6 
Ill. 11 15 5 R.I. 2 2 1 
Ind. 7 6 3 S.C. 5 5 1 
Iowa 3 4 2 S.D. 2 1 1 
Kans. 3 3 2 Tenn. 6 7 1 
Ky. 5 5 1 Tex. 21 19 12 
La. 5 6 2 Utah 3 1 2 
Maine 1 2 2 Vt. 1 1 1 
Md. 5 7 2 Va. 8 7 3 
Mass. 5 8 4 Wash. 5 6 3 
                                                                                                                          
226 Robin Toner, The 1992 Elections: President—The Overview, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/04/us/1992-elections-president-overview-clinton-captures-presidenc 
y-with-huge.html. 
227 Election of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection 
.php?year=1992 [http://perma.cc/S7CX-H57G] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 The cubed root of the 1990 population was 628.875, but the Webster Method would have 
provided for 635 representatives. 
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Mich. 10 11 5 W.V. 3 3 1 
Minn. 4 6 3 Wis. 5 6 3 
Miss. 4 4 1 Wyo. 1 1 1 
Mo. 5 7 3 DC 0 3 0 
Mont. 1 2 1 Total 279 319 139 
 
Table 5 
 
Under my method, the Electoral College votes would have more 
closely matched the popular vote. Clinton still would have won the 
presidency, as he won 43.28% of the Electoral College vote to Bush’s 
37.86%. However, Perot would have won 18.86% of the Electoral College 
vote, which more closely resembles the amount of the popular vote that 
went in his favor. 
With vote-splitting, however, plurality wins will become more likely to 
occur. For this reason, the Twelfth Amendment should be reconsidered. 
B.  Amending the Constitution to Allow for Presidential Plurality Winners 
The most difficult change to make would be to amend the Constitution 
to allow for plurality vote winners. Because implementation of my 
proposals would likely result in an increase in plurality wins, the 
importance of allowing for plurality winners to take the presidency would 
increase. The Twelfth Amendment requires a majority of Electoral College 
votes for a presidential candidate to win.231 Should the Electoral College 
not choose a majority, the choice of the next president would be in the 
hands of the House of Representatives.232 Only three times in our nation’s 
history has this occurred, and of those three times, only once did the 
outcome reflect the votes of the people.  
In 1800, Thomas Jefferson won the popular vote and defeated 
incumbent John Adams in the Electoral College,233 but tied with his 
running mate Aaron Burr for the Electoral College vote, due to electors 
failing to distinguish between the offices of president and vice president on 
their ballots.234 Though the Twelfth Amendment had yet to be 
                                                                                                                          
231 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
232 Id. 
233 Election of 1800, DUKE UNIV. LIBR., http://library.duke.edu/exhibits/sevenelections/elections/ 
1800/winner.html [http://perma.cc/9SQN-QJXT] (last visited May 7, 2015). 
234 NAT’L ARCHIVES, TALLY OF ELECTORAL VOTES FOR THE 1800 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 
http://www.archives.gov/global-pages/larger-image.html?i=/legislative/features/1800-election/images/ 
1800-election-l.jpg&c=/legislative/features/1800-election/images/1800-election.caption.html [http://per 
ma.cc/9L6K-YG6Q] (last visited Dec. 1, 2015); Presidential Election of 1800: A Resource Guide, 
LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1800.html [http://perma.cc/ 
BL8L-T3QQ] (last visited May 7, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential Election of 1800]. 
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envisioned,235 Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provided for a House 
vote in the case of an Electoral College tie,236 and so the House chose the 
third president—Thomas Jefferson.237 While, after long deliberation, the 
House finally chose the candidate whom the people had elected, 
partisanship controlled the discussion and the decisions of many 
representatives, and the result could easily have been different.238  
In 1824, Andrew Jackson won the popular vote and a plurality of 
Electoral College votes.239 Yet, because of the Twelfth Amendment, the 
House determined the next president of the United States.240 Speaker of the 
House Henry Clay used his influence to ensure an Adams win, and in 
return Adams made Clay his secretary of state.241 Despite Jackson’s 
plurality wins in both the popular vote and the Electoral College, his 
candidacy for president ended when the House chose John Quincy Adams 
to be the sixth president.242  
Though the presidential outcome of 1876 was not dictated by the 
Twelfth Amendment, Congress determined the winner and nineteenth 
president.243 Democrat Samuel Tilden won the popular vote.244 Due to 
suspicions of unfairness in the election process, three states underwent 
recounts.245 Rutherford B. Hayes needed all nineteen Electoral College 
votes from the recounted states in order to secure the presidency.246 When 
all nineteen votes were awarded to Hayes, the Democrats showed their 
outrage by inaugurating their own governors and legislatures.247 Because 
                                                                                                                          
235 The election of 1800 was a large part of the reason for the creation of the Twelfth Amendment, 
which was first proposed in 1803. Presidential Election of 1800, supra note 234. 
236 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
237 Presidential Election of 1800, supra note 234. 
238 Id. (“Still dominated by Federalists, the sitting Congress loathed to vote for Jefferson—their 
partisan nemesis.”). 
239 NAT’L ARCHIVES, LIST OF VOTES FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, AS COUNTED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS, IN THE CHAMBER OF THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON WEDNESDAY, THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY, 1825, http://www.archives 
.gov/education/lessons/electoral-tally/images/tally-1824.jpg [http://perma.cc/KD5F-3UC9] (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2015); 1824 Presidential Election, 270 TO WIN, http://www.270towin.com/1824_Election/ 
[http://perma.cc/LP5L-969Y] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
240 Under the Twelfth Amendment, any presidential vote resulting in a plurality win must go to 
the House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
241 December 1, 1824: Presidential Election Goes to the House, HISTORY, http://www.hist 
ory.com/this-day-in-history/presidential-election-goes-to-the-house [http://perma.cc/ENS3-M9WN] 
(last visited May 7, 2015). 
242 Id. 
243 The Disputed Election of 1876, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/ 
general-article/grant-election/ [http://perma.cc/6Y4M-23XZ] (last visited May 7, 2015).  
244 Election of 1876, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection 
.php?year=1876 [http://perma.cc/KCS9-2Y3N] (last visited May 7, 2015). 
245 The Disputed Election of 1876, supra note 243. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
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the Constitution provided no guidance in such a matter, Congress created a 
commission of ten congressmen and five Supreme Court justices to make a 
determination.248 In the end, Southern Democrats made a deal with the 
committee; in exchange for ending harsh Reconstruction policies, all 
nineteen votes would go to Hayes, resulting in a total Electoral College 
vote of 185–184, and a Hayes presidency.249 Though the 1876 election was 
not governed by the Twelfth Amendment, leaving the decision in the hands 
of Congress resulted in partisanship, and may or may not have ended with 
the general electorate’s choice for president. 
When an election goes to the House, each state and the District of 
Columbia casts one vote for president.250 A candidate would need to win at 
least twenty-six states in order to win the presidency. Given the extreme 
partisanship in the House of Representatives, and the fact that in recent 
years representatives have almost exclusively voted along party lines,251 it 
follows that representatives would likely vote for the presidential candidate 
from their own party. 
Recall that, in 2000, Al Gore won the popular vote, but not the 
presidency.252 A look at each states’ 2000 representatives’ parties reveals a 
majority of Republican representatives in twenty-five states, a majority of 
Democrat representatives in twenty-one states,253 and no majority in five 
states. Had the 2000 Electoral College votes been split, without a 
constitutional amendment repealing the majority vote requirement of the 
Twelfth Amendment, the vote would have gone to the House, and Al Gore 
would have won only if all five tie states had voted for him.  
In fact, Democrats rely on larger states with higher Electoral College 
votes, whereas Republicans rely on larger amounts of small states in 
reaching for a majority. For example, Democrats often win states like 
California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois, which all have high 
Electoral College vote counts. On the other side, Republicans rely on many 
small states, such as Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, Utah, 
and others to collectively contribute large amounts of Electoral College 
votes. In 2008, John McCain won the Electoral College votes of twenty-
two states, yet the final tally revealed an overwhelming win for Barack 
                                                                                                                          
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 U.S. CONST. amend XII. 
251 See Wesley Lowery, How Congress Became So Partisan, in 4 Charts, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/14/how-congress-became-more-
partisan-over-time-in-four-charts [http://perma.cc/THJ9-CAB4] (mapping out the partisanship of 
Congress from the late 1960s through the 2010s to show how Congress has grown more partisan over 
time). 
252 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary, supra note 219. 
253 This number includes independent Representative Bernie Sanders of Vermont, whose ideology 
more closely aligns with Democrats than Republicans. 
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Obama, with 365 Electoral College votes to McCain’s 173.254 McCain took 
much of the South and the Midwest, resulting in a high state count voting 
in his favor, but a much smaller collective Electoral College vote count.255 
While the Electoral College exists to vote for the candidate most 
desired by the electorate of each state,256 House representatives exist to 
represent their respective constituencies, not the state as a whole.257 Even 
if, alternatively, representatives were to vote for the Electoral College 
winner of their state, Democrats would find it difficult, if not impossible, 
to win any presidency left to the House. Under my proposal, in the 2000 
election Democrats would have won fifteen states; Republicans would 
have won twenty-five; and eleven states would have no majority. So, for 
Al Gore , who won the popular vote, to win, he would have to win every 
single non-majority state.  
To allow the House to determine the president is to go against the “one 
person one vote” standard enunciated in Wesberry.258 While voters in 
Rhode Island counting for 1.88 times voters in Montana is egregious and 
contrary to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, allowing each state’s 
representatives to cast one vote for president would be many times more 
unfair to voters. California, with a population of nearly forty million, 
would cast one vote for president; Wyoming, with a population of just over 
half a million would also cast one vote for president. That means that 
Wyoming voters would count for more than sixty-seven times California 
voters. 
Because this change is so important to our election system, a 
constitutional amendment is appropriate. The amendment would only have 
to change the following lines of the Twelfth Amendment: 
The person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose 
                                                                                                                          
254 Election for the Fifty-Sixth Term, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/votes/2000_2005.html#2008 [http://perma.cc/ARK3-EQ9J] (last visited May 
7, 2015). 
255 Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. 
House of Representatives, FED. ELECTION COMM’N   (July 2009), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/ 
federalelections2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/K36Z-GJLF]. 
256 Who Are the Electors?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/electors.html [http://perma.cc/L3RW-GT5H] (last visited May 7, 2015). 
257 This is the job of senators. See The Senate and the United States Constitution, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Constitution_Senate.htm [http://perma.c 
c/48E7-D7LL] (last visited May 14, 2015) (discussing the role of the Senate). 
258 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
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immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the 
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for 
this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-
thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be 
necessary to a choice.259 
Congress should pass such an amendment to make sure their 
constituents are adequately represented. However, should my other 
proposals be implemented, elections will become more fair and 
representative even without this constitutional amendment. 
C.  My Proposals and the Constitutional Framework 
Unlike with my two core proposals, the states must support Electoral 
College vote-splitting and amending the Constitution. Each state will have 
to choose Electoral College vote-splitting in its own turn. However, non-
swing states are incentivized to do so,260 and once enough of these states 
choose vote-splitting, swing states will be incentivized to follow.261 
Because the Constitution expressly allows for states to choose their 
electors,262 and each state may choose its method of Electoral College 
voting, and two states have already successfully done so, no constitutional 
challenge to states making this decision exists. 
Finally, part of the Twelfth Amendment would have to be repealed by 
a new constitutional amendment in order to allow for plurality winners. 
While passing a constitutional amendment is not as easy as passing a 
statute, Congress has reason to take up this cause. Though the House of 
Representatives would technically be giving up a power, it is a power that 
has scarcely been used. Further, both parties have cause to want to avoid a 
House vote. Should there be more Democratic representatives during a 
presidential vote sent to the House, Republicans will likely lose the 
presidency, even if they win the plurality or popular vote. The same goes 
for a House controlled by Republican representatives and a Democratic 
plurality winner. States should ratify such an amendment because it is in 
the best interest of their constituents.  
The Framers agreed during the Great Compromise that the House of 
Representatives should be proportional. For this proportionality, small 
states took disproportionate representation in the Senate.263 Wyoming, 
                                                                                                                          
259 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
260 See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the benefits of Electoral College vote-splitting). 
261 See supra note 206. Further, swing states would benefit too because voters would be more 
accurately represented.  
262 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
263 See supra note 23. 
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population 563,626, and California, population 37,253,956, each have two 
senators.264 It is because the House is supposed to be proportional that 
California having sixty-six times the population of Wyoming, yet the same 
number of senators, is permissible. But when the House is capped at 435 
representatives, a growing amount of proportionality is lost. For these 
reasons, the vote should not go to the House, and the Twelfth Amendment 
should be amended to allow for plurality winners. 
My proposal is summarized as follows: (1) Congress passes a statute 
repealing the Apportionment Act of 1911 and providing for a House with 
as many representatives as the cubed root of the population; (2) requiring 
usage of the Webster Method of apportionment; (3) states choose to split 
their Electoral College votes proportionally; and (4) Congress proposes 
and the states ratify a constitutional amendment nullifying the part of the 
Twelfth Amendment that requires a majority Electoral College vote for any 
candidate to win the presidency. To see how this might work, Part V.A.5 
above applies my plan to the controversial 2000 presidential election. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Though, in the strictest sense, applying “one person one vote” to 
interstate apportionment is unlikely to happen, apportionment procedure 
should at least strive towards that goal. The Framers believed in a larger 
House so that constituents might be adequately represented. Because the 
Electoral College is based on apportionment, it is imperative that 
proportionality, accuracy, and fairness dominate the process.  
Using the Cubed Root Law will increase the size of the House by over 
two hundred representatives, which will help to create district sizes in each 
state closer to the average. Using the Webster Method will increase 
accuracy in apportionment. States choosing to split Electoral College votes 
will result in presidential elections that more closely reflect the will of the 
people. And amending the Constitution to change the majority requirement 
of the Twelfth Amendment will ensure that the candidate with the highest 
vote count wins. 
The Court should not hesitate to take up the issue of interstate 
apportionment. So far it has already found that disparities between in-state 
district sizes are unconstitutional. Their justification for this finding also 
applies to interstate apportionment. House representatives could only 
benefit their constituents by making these proposed changes to the law and 
to the Constitution. Creating a better-represented electorate will help to 
ensure the right outcomes in presidential elections. 
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